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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TI-IE STATE OF UTAH 
LEROY SCHULTZ, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- No. 15134 
JOSE QUINTANA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action in which plaintiff seeks to recover damages 
for personal injuries sustained on defendant's property due to the negli-
gence of the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried before an eight-person jury in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lak:e County, State of Utah, with 
the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. presiding. From a judgment for 
the plaintiff, defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant asks that the judgment against him be set aside 
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and that the verdict be reversed in his favor as a matter of law, or in 
the alternative defendant asks for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Jose Quintana, was defendant in a personal injury 
suit tried in the Third Judicial District Court on March 16 and 17, 1977. 
Plaintiff, Leroy Schultz, alleged that appellant was negligent in the 
placement of certain survey stakes on defendant's property, over one of 
which plaintiff claimed that he tripped, sustaining injuries which allegedly 
disabled him for 88 days. Plaintiff sought to recover special damages for 
medical treatment and lost wages as a railroad switchman in the amount 
of $6, 739 .19. Plaintiff also claimed general damages for pain and suffer-
ing in the amount of $40, 000. 00. 
The survey stake, over which plaintiff claimed that he 
stumbled, was allegedly driven on or near the property line of defen -
dant' s property at 2422 Lake Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. The rear of 
appellant's property abutted land owned by the Utah State Road Commis-
sion on the date of the alleged injury, August 25, 1974. Appellant had 
received notice of his successful bid on the property August 21, 1974, 
having bid $188. 89 more than the unsuccessful bidder, his next door 
neighbor and the plaintiff Schultz. Plaintiff had a prescriptive easement 
in a coarsely graveled north-south right-of-way abutting defendant's 
property, by which right-of-way he gained access to parking and a 
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garage at the rear of his property at 2420 Lake Street. Appellant 
responded in an interrogatory that he drove the survey stakes on or 
about August 24, 1974, in such a line as to identify and preserve his 
neighbor's right-of-way which he believed to be between the west 
boundaries of the Lake Street lots and the east boundary of the property 
he acquired from the state. The stakes were installed to delineate the 
property line on which a fence was to be built later between defendant's 
property and plain tiff's right-of -way. 
On the night of the alleged injury, plaintiff had backed his 
car south over the gravel driveway turning west onto a second east-west 
paved public right-of-way that would lead him to Lake Street and thence 
to work. Plaintiff stopped his car on the paved right-of-way and in the 
dark rushed across defendant's property to his residence to get his 
lantern. In his haste and in the dark, hurrying over the loosely 
graveled right-of-way, plaintiff stumbled and fell. Plaintiff brought 
this action to recover damages sustained in that fall. The jury on 
special verdict found the defendant-appellant 75 percent negligent and 
awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of $3, 342.26 plus costs. 
Plaintiff's attorney introduced the case to the jury with the 
following opening remarks: 
MR. HARMSEN: •.. Ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury, the Judge has 
explained to you the nature of this 
-3-
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case and I am sure that many of you 
having owned homes or been involved 
in having friends who have been in -
valved in lawsuits or just generally 
being aware of the problem of owning 
a home, the problems of life in gen -
era!, may be [sic] have some what 
[sic] of a prejudice against personal 
injury cases, at least the idea that 
there is a lot of people running 
around that every time they get into 
an accident all of a sudden there [sic] 
neck starts to hurt and all of a sudden 
there [sic] back starts to feel sore 
and then they think that may be [sic J 
the excuse to go to the insurance 
company and get a large settlement--
(Reporter' s transcript on appeal, 
page 3.) 
The Court admonished plaintiff's attorney and said: 
The jury will disregard everything 
Mr. Harmsen had to say up to this 
point. You may start again, Mr. 
Harmsen. 
At the noon recess, the following conversation took place 
between the Court and Mr. Fratto, defendant's attorney of record at 
trial: 
THE COURT: I was going to ask, 
did you have anything else on the 
opening statement you wanted to 
make in the record? 
MR. FRATTO: Yes, I will say a 
few words. 
THE COURT: Yes, but on Mr. 
Harmsen' s? 
-4-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
MR. FRATTO: What was that? 
I didn't get it. 
THE COURT: Did you have any 
motions to malce concerning it? 
MR. FRATTO: No. 
THE COURT: All right, you have 
waived them then. I would have 
granted a mistrial if you had asked 
for it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON THE STANDARD 
OF CARE A PROPERTY OWNER OWES TO 
PERSONS INJURED ON HIS PROPERTY. 
Over appellant's objection (Reporter's transcript of trial, 
page 191), the Court gave the following instruction to the jury: 
The rights of a person to use and 
enjoy his property is qualified by a 
duty to exercise reasonable care for 
the safety of others who may pass 
by his property. 
The duty of an owner of property 
adjacent to a right of way extends 
not only to the user of the right of 
way but also those who reasonably 
stray a short distance from the 
right of way for a casual purpose, 
(Emphasis added.) 
The owner of land abutting the right 
of way may be negligent creating an 
unsafe condition thereon. 
-s-
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An unsafe condition as that term is 
used in these instructions, means 
a condition on the land in question 
involving an unreasonable risk of 
injury to persons properly using 
such area. 
While the instruction given may be proper in some cases, 
it was clearly improper under the facts of this case. The duty of care 
which a property owner owes to others who are injured on his premises 
is determined by classifying the injured party as either an invitee, 
licensee, or trespasser. This court defined the classes of persons in 
Stevens v. Salt Lake County, 25 Utah 2d 168, 478 P .2d 496 (1970). The 
court defined an invitee as a person who goes onto the premises of 
another at the invitation of the owner, a licensee is one who goes on the 
land of another without invitation but with the landowner's permission, 
and a trespasser is one who goes on the land of another without the per-
mission or invitation of the landowner. 
Under the facts of this case, even read in the light most 
consistent with the jury's verdict, the plaintiff could not 'lualify as an 
invitee or licensee, as the defendant neither invited nor gave permission 
to the plaintiff to enter his premises. Furthermore, the plaintiff did not 
introduce any evidence to show that he was on the defendant's premises 
at the invitation or with the permission of the defendant. Therefore, 
when the plaintiff tripped over the surveyor's stake on defendant's 
-6-
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property, he was a trespasser, for the burden of proof to prove a 
higher standard of care rested on the plaintiff, which burden he failed 
to meet by failing to introduce any evidence of the facts necessary to 
charge defendant with the higher standard of care. 
The fact that a person's entrance onto another's property 
was innocent or the encroachment was very slight is not sufficient to 
render a trespasser an invitee or licensee, nor does the motive, state 
of mind, or reasonableness of the actor alter a property owner's lia-
bility. 62 Am. ]ur. 2d Premises Liability § 55, at 297-9, 
The general rule governing the duty of an owner is that the 
observance of due care by an owner toward a trespasser requires no 
affirmative conduct to render the premises safe for his use, but only 
that the possessor must refrain from injuring the trespasser unneces-
sarily by willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. Martin v. Jones, 122 
Utah 597, 253 P .2d 359 (1953). The holding of Martin, supra, was 
succinctly restated by the Utah State Bar in the form of two jury instruc-
tions in JIFU, Instruction Nos. 45. 3 and 45 .10, which state: 
45 .3 Duty of Owner of Land Toward 
Trespasser. A trespasser cannot 
recover for failure of the possessor 
of land to do acts to facilitate the 
trespass or to render it safe; nor can 
he recover for failure of the possessor 
to exercise care in his management of 
the premises or in maintenance of 
conditions or his activities thereon. 
-7-
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45 .10 Liability of Owner for Artificial 
Conditions on Land. [If you believe 
from a preponderance of the evidence 
that] plaintiff was a trespasser as that 
term is herein defined, he would be 
entitled to recover from defendant only 
if you find from preponderance of the 
evidence the following: 
(a) that plaintiff's injury, if any, was 
proximately caused by an artifi-
cially created condition on the 
premises, and 
(b) the condition was such that it 
involved a risk of serious bodily 
harm to persons coming in con -
tact therewith, and 
(c) the defendant knew or from facts 
within his knowledge, should have 
known of the presence of tres -
passers in dangerous proximity 
to the condition referred to, and 
(d) the condition was such nature that 
in the exercise of reasonable care 
the defendant should have antici-
pated that trespassers would not 
discover it or realize the risk 
involved therein, and 
(e) the defendant failed to use reason -
able care to warn of the said 
dangerous condition. 
The comparison of the instruction which the trial court 
judge gave over defendant's objection to the state of the law in Utah 
clearly demonstrates that the given instruction was erroneous. Para-
graph 2 of the given instruction reads: 
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The duty of an owner of property 
adjacent to a right of way extends 
not only to the user of the right of 
way but also those who reasonably 
stray a short distance from the 
right of way for a casual purpose. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In effect, the instruction imposes upon a landowner a duty to a tres -
passer far in excess of what is required under Martin v. Jones, supra. 
Furthermore, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the differ-
ent classes of persons who enter another's premises and the respective 
duties owned to each class constituted plain error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT WAS ERROR. 
There can be no doubt that the burden of proving each and 
every element of negligence was upon the plaintiff, including the burden 
of establishing a duty of care owed by defendant to plaintiff. It was 
plaintiff's burden to show under what class of individuals (invitee, 
licensee, or trespasser) he claimed a duty owed. Since at the close of 
plaintiff's case he had introduced no evidence that he was on defendant's 
property at the invitation of the defendant (invitee) or with the permis-
sion of the defendant (licensee), the only question which remained under 
defendant's motion for directed verdict was whether plaintiff could 
recover as a trespasser 0 As previously stated, Martin v. Jones, ~up~, 
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requires the following in order for a trespasser to recover for injuries 
sustained on the property of another: 
(1) the plaintiff's injuries, if any, 
must be proximately caused by 
an artificially created condition 
on the premises, and 
(2) the condition was such that it 
involved the risk of serious 
b'Xlily harm to persons coming 
in contact therewith, and 
(3) the defendant knew or from 
facts within his knowledge should 
have known of the presence of 
trespassers in dangerous pro xi -
mity to the condition referred 
to, and 
(4) the condition was of such narure 
that in the exercise of reasonable 
care the defend;:mt should have 
anticipated that trespassers 
would not discover or realize 
the risk involved therein, and 
(5) the defendant failed to use 
reasonable care to warn of the 
said dangerous condition. 
While arguably the plaintiff could satisfy some of the 
requirements of Martin, it was clear as a matter of law that driving 
12-inch surveyor's stakes into the ground did not involve a risk of 
serious bodily harm to others, nor was the condition of such narure 
that he would anticipate that strangers would not discover it or realize 
the risk involved therein. And finally as a matter of law, the trial 
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L 
court should have ruled that placing 12-inch surveyor's stakes on 
defendant's own property line was not unreasonable and that if a duty 
were owed the defendant did not breach that duty. 
POINT III 
THE DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S ATTORNEY BY INTERJECTING THE 
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT 
HAD HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE SO PREJU-
DICED THE JURY THAT IN THE INTERESTS 
OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE JUDGMENT 
FOR PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE REVERSED OR 
REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant recognizes the mere mention of insurance does 
not in all cases lead to the conclusion that the jury was prejudiced or 
likely to be to such an extent that .a fair trial could not be had. Robinson 
v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965). However, in the 
instant case there can be no doubt that the interjection of insurance by 
plaintiff's attorney into the trial was deliberate and calculated as the 
plaintiff's attorney knew that the defendant did not in fact have any insur-
ance on the property nor was insurance available to pay off any recovery 
by the defendant. (Answer to interrogatories, dated the 9th day of June, 
1975, answer to question number 4.) Furthermore, the trial court made 
it clear that if defendant's attorney had have asked for a mistrial, a 
mistrial would have been granted. (Transcript of trial, page 34 .) 
It is therefore clear that the interjection of insurance 
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coverage as an issue in the trial by plaintiff's attorney is sufficient to 
require a mistrial if the defendant's request for a new trial has not been 
waived or otherwise lost. 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that: 
(b) Time for Motion. Motion for a 
new trial shall be served not 
later than ten days after the 
entry of the judgment. 
At the noon recess on the first day, the judge informed the 
defendant that he had waived any motion for a mistrial or a new trial by 
failing to then ask for it. Such a ruling was clearly in contradiction of 
Rule 59. It is defendant's position that the trial court judge cannot by 
virtue of his own declaration reduce the allowed time for a motion for 
a new trial from the ten days allowed under Rule 59 and require such a 
motion be made during trial. By virtue of the trial court's ruling, the 
defendant has been deprived of his right to petition for a new trial under 
Rule 59, and therefore this court should correct the error by granting a 
new trial. 
Even if defendant's former counsel waived any legal objec-
tions to the introduction of the prejudicial statement, the judgment 
against defendant should be set aside under Rule 60. Rule 60 provides 
that a court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment for mistake, inadvertence, 
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surprise, or excusable neglect. In the instant case, defendant's 
former counsel inadvertently failed to raise his objection to the intro -
duction of the evidence by plaintiff's counsel during trial. Rule 60 
further provides that the procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be either by motion or, as in the instant case, by an 
independent action. Since the trial court has already expressed its 
views as to the fact that defendant's counsel had waived any objection to 
the prejudicial statements, it is now proper in the interests of fairness 
and justice to relieve the defendant from the judgment on appeal. 
Prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's attorney affected the 
substantial right of appellant to a fair trial. The judgment and verdict 
of the jury appear inconsistent with substantial justice. The allowance 
of vacation of judgment is a creature of equity designed to relieve 
against harshness of enforcing the judgment which may occur through 
procedural difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes 
which prevent the presentation of a claim or a defense. Warren v. DiXOI_! 
Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P .2d 741 (1953). The instant case is a 
clear example of where equity will prevent the plaintiff from benefiting 
from the deliberate misconduct of his counsel and will at the same time 
afford to a defendant a fair and equitable trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment against the defendant should, as a matter of 
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law, be reversed or in the alternative remanded for a new trial. From 
the facts presented at trial, it is clear that the plaintiff failed to sustain 
its burden of proof as to the duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff. Furthermore, the trial court improperly instructed the jury 
on the duty owed to a trespasser by the owner or occupier of land. 
Finally, in the interests of equity, the judgment should be reversed or 
remanded due to the deliberate prejudicial misconduct of plaintiff's 
attorney. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant were served on Stephen M. Harmsen, attorney for p!aintiff-
respondent, 350 South 400 East, #G-1, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this_~tl-1 , day of August, 1977. 
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